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Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context 
 
 
Neil Walker 
 
1. Three Forms of Scepticism about Constitutional Pluralism 
 
Constitutional pluralism divides opinion. Those features that make it attractive to 
some in a globally connected world also account for the scepticism it provokes in 
others.  The allure of constitutional pluralism lies in its ambition to square two ideas – 
‘constitutionalism’ and ‘pluralism’ - that are typically understood as quite distinct and 
presumptively incompatible, or at least as of limited compatibility. On the one hand, 
the idea of constitutionalism – of a legal code that supplies a legitimate foundation 
and framework for our common forms of political life – has been traditionally 
understood in unitary and hierarchical terms. That is to say, it is taken to refer to a 
single, bounded, and ultimately indivisible ‘unit’ - paradigmatically the state – and to 
do so in terms of an unbroken chain of authority and an encompassing legal ordering.1   
On the other hand, when we speak of pluralism, whether we are concerned with a 
‘first order’ pluralism of social constituencies,2 or of institutions,3 or of values,4 or of 
value sets and world-views,5
                                                 
1 See e.g.  D. Grimm, “The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization”, (2005) 12 Constellations 
447;  M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State” in J. L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds) Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: CUP,  2009) 258-325. 
 or - of most direct immediate relevance – with a ‘second 
2 See e.g. R. A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power” (1957) 2 Behavioural Science 201-215 
3 See e.g.  V. Bader, “Religious Diversity And Democratic Institutional Pluralism  (2003) 31 Political 
Theory: 265 - 294. 
4 See e.g. I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberalism (Oxford: OUP, 1969) 
5  See e.g. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996); R. Bellamy, 
Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise (London: Routledge, 1999). 
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order’ pluralism of legal and political systems as a whole, the emphasis is always 
upon multiplicity and diversity and upon the non-hierarchical terms of the recognition 
and accommodation of that multiplicity and diversity.  In crude terms, the 
constitutional pluralist seeks to retain from constitutionalism the idea of a single 
authorizing register for the political domain as a whole while at the same time 
retaining from pluralism a sense of the rich and irreducible diversity of that political 
domain.   
 For the advocate of constitutional pluralism, moreover, the attraction is a 
matter both of fact and of value - of the force of circumstance as well as of preference. 
The fact that the constitutional landscape today - in our post-Westphalian age where 
globalizing economic, cultural, communicative, political and legal influences have 
both spread and diluted public power - is no longer organised into mutually exclusive 
nation state domains but instead occupies much overlapping transnational space, 
cannot help but alter our understanding of constitutional ordering. It means that, at 
least as the constitutional pluralist views the world, it becomes increasingly difficult if 
not impossible not to conceive of the environment of constitutionalism in non-unitary 
terms – as a place of heterarchically interlocking legal and political systems.6
 For the sceptic, on the other hand, any such sense of opportunity can only be 
the product of wishful thinking.  Rather than achieving the reconciliation of opposites, 
  The 
dimension of value lies in viewing this changing landscape not as a threat to the 
maintenance of the traditional template of constitutionalism but as a welcome 
opportunity to integrate what in conventional constitutional wisdom tend to be treated 
as contrasting and even opposing modalities of normative thought. The constitutional 
pluralist, in short, seeks to make a virtue out of necessity 
                                                 
6  On the descriptive dimension of constitutional pluralism, see N. Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional 
Pluralism” (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317.  
3 
 
constitutional pluralism is always poised to collapse under the weight of its internal 
contradictions. And if it does so, this will not signal a new constitutional dawn. 
Rather, it will imply, at best, a retreat to a state-centred constitutional orthodoxy, and, 
at worst, the degrading or even the exhaustion of the constitutional paradigm as a 
whole in the late modern age. More specifically, for the sceptic there are three 
potential structural weak-points, and so three points of possible implosion, within 
constitutional pluralism. A consideration of   each allows us to introduce three key 
challenges. 
In the first place, constitutional pluralism may, on closer inspection, simply 
mutate and settle into a new form of constitutional monism or singularity. That is to 
say, the tendency towards unity and hierarchy in constitutional logic and in the 
constitutional mindset may be strong or even incorrigible, and if this is so then new 
constitutional initiatives, practices or world-views that reach into the transnational 
sphere will tend to adopt the form of the statist original. Whether we are talking about 
the constitution of the European Union, or the United Nation’s ‘world order’ 
constitution,7 or even the informal ‘higher order’ constitution suggested by the 
elevated status of certain contemporary international law norms,8 what we see 
wherever and whenever constitutionalism is invoked beyond the state, and whatever 
its ostensible commitment to openness and sustainable diversity, is a tendency 
towards a new manifestation of closure and a new reduction to unity; towards the old 
familiar of  everything deemed constitutional being contained  - ‘constituted’ indeed  - 
within the one hierarchically layered legal and political system.9
                                                 
7  See in particular B. Fassbender ‘The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International 
Community’, (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of International Law, 529. 
 There is no room in 
8   See e.g.  E. De Wet “The International Constitutional Order”, (2006) International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly. 55, 51-76 
9  See e.g.  D. Kennedy, “The Mystery of Global Governance” in Dunoff and Trachtman (eds) Ruling 
the World? 37-68; M. Koskenniemi “The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and 
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that perspective for the unresolved heterarchical configuration or the open-ended 
jurisdictional extension of a constitutionalism decoupled from a singular legal and 
political order. 
In the second place, and conversely, traces of constitutionalism beyond the 
state may be viewed not as an extension and mutation that will ultimately take the 
form of a new and encompassing unity, but, just as in the classic age of the 
Westphalian state system, as a series of separate reductions. On this view, 
constitutional pluralism turns out to be nothing more than constitutional plurality. 
That is to say, the flip-side of the structural tendency of constitutional framing to 
provide the bounded and hierarchically ordered legal space of the state may be that if 
anything is to escape such a space but still be considered as properly ‘constitutional’ 
in character, it can only do so on the basis of its belonging to a quite distinct and  
unconnected bounded and hierarchically ordered constitutional entity. For if 
constitutional norms operate according to a singular and hierarchical regulatory logic, 
then there is simply no conceptual scope for any heterarchical legal relations that 
operate between distinct constitutional singularities to possess its own properly and 
distinctly  constitutional character, or at least not from the perspective of these 
constitutional singularities themselves. In other words, if we seek to distinguish the 
overlapping and interlocking of constitutional orders from mere constitutional 
plurality or diversity on the basis that it involves a commitment to the common 
recognition and accommodation – and to that extent the integrity - of the diverse parts 
notwithstanding their diversity, then the exhaustiveness of each of the different 
constitutional orders in their own terms means that we lack the requisite  
constitutional code operating independently of the overlapping and interlocking 
                                                                                                                                            
Politics” (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 1; E. Christodoulidis, “Constitutional Irresolution: Law and 
the Framing of Civil Society” (2003) 9 European Law Journal 401. 
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constitutional orders in which any such transversal integrity can be registered.10
In the third place, if and to the extent that it is nevertheless possible to think of 
relations between different legal entities as pluralist in quality, and not simply 
collapsing into either the monolithic discipline of constitutional singularity or the 
mutual indifference of constitutional plurality, then this may be precisely because the 
entities in question do not possess or claim just such a constitutional character. If we 
want to conceive of different legal entities within the increasingly fragmented global 
archipelago as connected in ways which remain legally meaningful without these 
legal relations resulting in such entities being ultimately subsumed within a single 
legal order, the development of the requisite legal imaginary may only be possible if 
 
Whether we are dealing with the new type of relations between the constitutional 
orders of states and that of the supranational EU, or between NAFTA and the states of 
North America, or the UN and the states of the world, or amongst the various 
emergent non-state polities, or whether we revert our gaze to the ‘old-fashioned’ 
terms of exchange between different states themselves, therefore, on this view the 
idea of meaningfully  constitutional relations between distinct constitutional orders is 
simply incoherent. 
                                                 
10  There are in fact two closely related if apparently quite distinct versions of this concern or criticism. 
One - closely associated with a certain type of approach  which remains presumptively sympathetic to 
constitutional pluralism - raises the prospect that  there is simply nothing left to say in constitutional, or 
indeed in any kind of legal terms, about the relations between constitutional orders which are  each 
already conceived of in a bounded manner.  Here, the danger is that constitutional pluralism is left 
conceptually barren.  This so-called radical pluralist approach is further considered  in  Section 2  of the 
text below. A second criticism, presumptively unsympathetic to constitutional pluralism, holds that an 
acceptance of the pluralist scenario is likely to lead  not to a conceptual void in the law, and so to a 
domain of non-law,  but to a situation of overabundance. For if constitutional pluralism simply alerts us 
to a plurality of legal order unities, then rather than an absence of legal answers to difficult questions in 
areas of overlapping jurisdiction what we have, strictly speaking,  are too many answers, each valid 
from its own systemic perspective.  Which law happens to prevail in practice becomes a matter of 
circumstance rather than principle, and the law as a whole in the area of contested overlap may thus 
come to lack predictability or a coherent framework of justification. See e.g.   J. Baquero Cruz, “The 
Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement”  (2008) 14 European Law Journal  389; 
P. Eletheriadis, “Pluralism and Integrity” (2010) 23  Ratio Juris . 
6 
 
we dispense with the constraining and increasingly anachronistic language of 
constitutionalism as an appropriate characterization of such entities.11
To recap then, constitutional pluralism may be rejected either on the basis that 
its pluralist credentials do not add up – that it is ultimately (i) either monism with new 
and wider horizons or (ii) mere plurality – or on the basis (iii) that if  it is genuinely 
pluralistic then this is at the expense of its specifically constitutional quality. Taken 
together, these three challenges introduce a formidable range of arguments against 
constitutional pluralism in the new global context. In what follows, I will examine 
how different theories of the global regulatory configuration stand in relation to 
constitutional pluralism and its critique – whether as explicit advocates of one or more 
of the three key challenges to constitutional pluralism, or at least as assuming a 
position consistent with such challenges; or, alternatively, as taking a position that 
invites one or more of such challenges; or as actively addressing and responding to 
such challenges. 
 
 Before doing so, however, I want to say something about the implications of 
the fact that constitutional pluralism was first developed in the European 
supranational theatre rather than in the wider global arena. On the one hand, the 
particular terms of the European debate accounted for much of the early buoyancy of 
constitutional pluralist thinking and for its readiness to rise to the sceptical challenge. 
On the other hand, by developing the theoretical perspective of constitutional 
pluralism in conditions that were unusually favourable, this regional concentration has 
skewed the terms of debate. And in so doing it has retarded – or at least left untested - 
the capacity of constitutional pluralist thinking to confront the full weight of the 
                                                 
11  See in particular the work of Nico Krisch; “Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional 
Ambition” In P. Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford: OUP, 
2010) 245-266; “The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law”  LSE Legal Studies Working Papers 
12/2009, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1418707  
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sceptical challenge in the wider global context. Nevertheless, I will argue in the 
concluding sections that, for all its over-reliance on the European context, and for all 
the difficulties posed by the broader transnational regulatory environment, there 
remain today good arguments for pursuing the project of adapting the language and 
mindset of constitutionalism to meet the pluralist imperatives of broader global 
conditions.  In making this argument, I want to stress that what matters is not the label 
‘constitutional pluralist’ –  overused and overstretched, and unworthy of its implicit 
claim to constitute  a single School of thought12
 
 -  but the basic intellectual sense that 
it remains worth thinking and talking  about the architecture of  global law in 
constitutional terms.  
2. Constitutional Pluralism in Europe  
 
The idea of constitutional pluralism derived a lot of its initial focus and momentum 
from the circumstances of high-profile constitutional clashes over the implications of 
Europe’s supranational arrangements. The key sites of these clashes were the supreme 
or constitutional courts of the member states. Faced with  issues such as  the 
compatibility of new instruments of supranational authority with national standards of 
human rights,13 the reconciliation of  a  Treaty-by-Treaty expansion of overall 
supranational jurisdiction into areas of public policy traditionally associated with the 
nation state with the basic idea of national democratic control,14
                                                 
12  On which see J. Weiler, “Prologue – Constitutionalism – Global and Pluralist”  in  G de Burca and  
J. Weiler  (eds) The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge: CUP,  2011) . 
 the tension between 
13  See e.g. Internationae Handelsgesellschaft mbH  v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel  [1974] 2 CMLR 540 
14  See e.g.  Brunner v. European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. This landmark case concerned the 
constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty, but every subsequent European Treaty, including the 
abortive Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty which succeeded it, has likewise given rise to 
litigation in national constitutional or supreme courts. For reflection on the decisions of the German 
and other top courts prior to ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, see, for example, the special issue of the 
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accession to a mature transnational polity and a minimum sense of sovereign self-
determination,15 or the extent to which transnational security concerns may encroach 
on core national responsibilities in criminal justice,16
As an account of these cases and of their context of emergence and reception, 
constitutional pluralism has an immediate plausibility. If we take the three core 
challenges in turn, to each of these the European case has offered a strong prima facie 
answer. In the first place, the European example is one where, whatever fears may be 
expressed in different quarters about the overweening ‘constitutional’ ambitions either 
of the member states or of the EU itself, the diversely-sourced and wide-ranging 
invocation of the language and logic of constitutionalism in the face of legal and 
political contestation shows no realistic prospect of being resolved in terms of a newly 
minted, widely accepted and broadly effective constitutional unity. The relevant 
organs of the EU remain implacable in their own claims to self-standing legal 
 national courts have in a 
prolonged series of high profile cases been  required to adjudicate on the basic source 
and conditions of final constitutional authority in contexts where the states and the EU 
palpably possessed overlapping competence. And in so doing, these national courts 
have tended to affirm or to develop conceptions of constitutionalism which, in 
stressing or assuming the autochthonous quality of state constitutional authority and 
the national distinctiveness of its content, have been prepared to countenance the 
claims to authority emanating from the judicial organs of the EU only on their own 
nationally conditional terms and not on the absolute terms set or assumed by the EU 
itself 
                                                                                                                                            
German Law Journal (2009) Vol. 10 No. 8. available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=2&vol=10&no=8 
15  See e.g. Polish member of the European Union (Accession Treaty) K18/04, 11th M<ay 2005. see 
more generally, W. Sadurski “Solange Chapter 3; Constitutional Courts in Central Europe – democracy 
– European Union” (2008) 14 European Law Journal  1-35.  
16  See e.g. the various decisions on the legality of the European arrest warrant, discussed in Cruz, n10 
above. 
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authority and in the invocation of a constitutionally familiar language and ethos of 
primacy-with-an-integrated-legal-order, but equally, the relevant constitutional organs 
of the 27 member states continue to make plausible and robust claims to their own 
original and final constitutional authority for all matters within their national purview, 
including the jointly designed supranational edifice.17
 In the second place, however, this does not mean that the European 
supranational domain is easily categorized merely as a plurality of constitutional 
unities without a plausibly constitutional connection. Institutionally, we can point to a 
number of bridging mechanisms which in the round provide more intimate terms of 
communication and exchange between the relevant state and the non-state legal 
entities than is the case in any other postnational setting.  If we consider the 
provisions for the direct domestic applicability (in the case of regulations) or 
compulsory transposition (in the case of directives) of supranational legislation as 
well as for its  judicial enforcement, for the unmediated implementation of much 
supranational administration through the Commission and various European agencies, 
and for the obligatory (preliminary) reference of questions of the authoritative 
interpretation of supranational law from national to supranational courts, it is clear 
that both within and across the three  key constitutional departments – legislature, 
executive and judiciary - there is close structural linkage between national and 
supranational sites of authority. Culturally, too, there is a thick familiarity of national 
constitutional heritages, one nurtured and reinforced by the gradual development first 
 
                                                 
17 In an earlier article I coined the term ‘epistemic pluralism’ to emphasize the fact that ‘descriptive 
pluralism’ in the European context had a deep, hermeneutic quality. That is to say, pluralism is 
appropriate here not just as an external description of the constitutional landscape, but is corroborated 
and reinforced by the deepest role self-understanding of the key actors themselves; see N. Walker n6 
above. 
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by judicial and then by statutory means of the idea of the ‘common constitutional 
traditions’ of the member states as an active agent of convergence.18
 Of course, these concurrent structural and cultural forces do not automatically 
transmute into constitutional matter. Indeed, as we shall see,
  
19
In the third place, the argument that it is possible to conceive of constitutional 
relations between the two levels of constitutional order – state and supranational – 
cannot easily be defeated by the objection that the European level does not bring 
‘true’ constitutional credentials to the table. For sure, the precise constitutional status 
of the EU is heavily contested, in particular the qualities in which and the degree to 
which the constitutionalism of the EU resembles that of the state. Indeed, much of the 
political debate surrounding the eventual failure in 2007 of the EU’s first explicit 
experiment in documentary constitutionalism concerned this very question.
 much of the debate 
within constitutional pluralism has concerned what, if anything is possible, and if 
anything is possible, what is necessary or desirable to complete the process of 
constitutional alchemy. What is clear, nonetheless, is that the background conditions 
for communication between different constitutional orders are comparably favourable 
in supranational Europe. 
20 
Alongside deep disputation of the detailed constitutional credentials of the EU, 
however, there has in recent years grown up a consensus that the EU does nonetheless 
possess a constitutional character of sorts.21
                                                 
18  See e.g. F. Balvesi. “The “Common Constitutional Traditions” and the Integration of the EU”; 
available at: http://www.dirittoequestionipubbliche.org/page/2006_n6/mono_02_Belvisi.pdf 
 In legal terms, with its doctrines of 
primacy and direct effect and its overall development of an autonomous legal order, 
and in institutional terms, with its dense and complex governance architecture of 
19 See Section 3 of the text below. 
20 See e.g., N. Walker, “Reframing EU Constitutionalism” in Dunoff and Trachtman (eds) Ruling the 
World? 149-77. 
21 On some of the reasons for this, see Walker  ibid, 149-50. 
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Commission, Council, European Council, Parliament and Court, the EU appears to 
have a material constitution that is closely analogous to and often draws heavily from 
the state tradition. It may lack many of the background factors normally associated 
with a ‘thicker’ “foundational” Constitutionalism and with a self-conscious political 
baptism22 but few today would deny it certain ‘thinner’ but still highly familiar 
constitutional credentials.23 Importantly, then, the sheer constitutional familiarity of 
the European set-up has diverted attention from what might be regarded as a key 
question. Especially as supranational Europe has matured as something broadly 
understood as a distinctive polity rather than as a mere outgrowth and epiphenomenon 
of other (state) polities, the emphasis has very much been on what kind of constitution 
it can have – and in particular how close to the state template – rather than whether it 
can have a constitution at all. In other words, for the most part the focus has come to 
rest on which of various diverse or graduated conceptions of constitutionalism is 
appropriate rather than on the threshold applicability of very constitutional concept.24
These various factors have come together to provide a kind of regional 
comfort zone for the ideas of constitutional pluralism.  The co-existence of a number 
of sites of undeniably significant legal authority making overlapping and inconsistent 
claims over the nature, scope  and implications of their various jurisdictions, and the 
fact that these different sites   are broadly understood by actors and observers alike as 
‘constitutional’ in quality, provides a ready set of answers to the first and third 
challenges. The second challenge – concerning the prospect of properly constitutional 
relations between and across constitutional units as opposed to the mere coincidence 
  
                                                 
22  Which, of course, a successful documentary constitutional process would have sought to provide. 
23 Although some who would not deny these credentials would still argue that the best way to 
understand and augment the relations between the different levels with the EU is by reference to a 
pluralist perspective which excludes the language of constitutionalism. See, e.g. M. Avbelj, present 
volume. 
24 On the distinction between a concept  and its various conceptions, see, e.g.,  R. Dworkin,  "The 
Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon",  (1972) 18(8)The New York Review of Books, 27-35 
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and contingent connection of their various and quite separate constitutional identities -  
- is the most acute one. And, as it raises the question of the normative dividend of 
constitutional pluralism, it is also, as already noted, the one that has excited most 
discussion within the field. On the one hand, there are those, often labelled radical 
pluralists, for whom nothing strictly constitutional can be said about the relations 
between different constitutional entities, although the fact that they are constitutional 
entities suggests that these relations may be conducted in terms which trade on 
common sensibilities or a shared understanding of the strategic context of 
interaction.25
                                                 
25  See in particular, N. MacCormick, “Beyond the Sovereign State” (1993) 56 Modern Law Review  1-
18; though he later modified his view, reintroducing public international law as the tertium quid to 
regulate relations between the national and the supranational levels. See his Questioning Sovereignty 
(Oxford: OUP, 1999) ch 7. See also Walker n6 above.  And see more recently,  Walker,  “Reconciling 
MacCormick: Constitutional Pluralism and the Unity of Practical Reason” (2011) 24(4)   Ratio Juris. 
My position then, as now, was that constitutional pluralism in the European theatre should be 
conceived of in constructivist terms; as an open-ended normative prospect, but still nevertheless a 
normative prospect.  According to this vision, we begin with no set formula for somehow transforming 
a plurality of overlapping constitutional sites into a ‘constitutionally reconciled’ legal space. There is 
no guarantee of such reconciliation, nor are there already-existing general trans-systemic constitutional 
norms in terms of which we can authorise that reconciliation.  Rather, on the basis of certain common 
sensibilities and a shared understanding of the strategic context of interaction we can envisage a 
tentative and iterative convergence (but never a Gadamerian ‘fusion’) of horizons from different 
system-specific starting points. This may include claims as to the universalizablity of certain norms, 
but these are only ever more or less persuasive claims – capable of being rebutted or refined in the 
context of ongoing exchange.   
 On the other hand, there are those who try to complete the process of 
constitutional alchemy, whether by reference to universal constitutional principles and 
Of course, normative open-endedness this conceived does not necessarily imply normative fragility. If 
the documentary constitutional experiment of 2003-5 had been successful, there would have existed – 
as an institutional fact – a document known as a Constitutional Treaty. In terms of their own criteria of 
recognition, both European courts (and other European institutional actors) and national courts (and 
other national institutional actors) would have been bound to recognize this document as normatively 
significant. Doubtless, the precise authoritative claim and status of such a Constitutional Treaty would 
still have been much disputed; whether a constitution for the European level alone, and so strongly 
authoritative only for European institutional actors (as national actors would likely have been inclined 
to argue), or somehow inhabiting a trans-systemic normative space – and so strongly authoritative at 
both levels (as European actors would likely have been inclined to argue). Nevertheless, for all the 
unresolved questions of authority, a successfully ratified documentary Constitution, which was by no 
means considered a remote possibility at the time, would have encouraged the development of a 
‘thicker’ sense of trans-systemic constitutional normativity of the sort we seek to identify under the 
label of constitutional pluralism.   
In short, the constructivist message holds that constitutional innovation, whether or not by  reference to 
a new type of canonical constitutional text , creates its own (open-ended) dynamic and  will succeed or 
fail in its own terms rather than with reference to some prior model of constitutional orthodoxy. 
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values of a substantive and structural nature,26 or by reference to jurisgenerative 
features of the particular dialogue between the different constitutional actors,27 or 
indeed some combination of the two.28
 Yet the practical importance of this area of difference and disagreement in the 
European context of debate should not be overstated.  The underlying descriptive and 
explanatory diagnosis is largely shared across the various pluralist perspectives, and 
given the close cultural and legal—structural ties between the states and the EU, those 
normative problems of reconciliation of the different orders that remain unanswerable 
or disputed are treated as of  ‘manageable’ dimensions – centred upon disagreements 
between ‘top courts’ -  rather than as fault lines affecting the overall configuration of 
authority in the European legal space. This is not to say that constitutional pluralists 
analysing the European field have been entirely blind to the fact that, just as there is 
more to constitutions than constitutional courts, so too there must be more to relations 
between constitutions than merely judicial difference and dialogue. For all their 
awareness in principle of the involvement of other institutions, however, the majority 
of commentators have in fact homed in on the courts as the most visible arena and the 
clearest manifestation of the problem - an exotic but essentially treatable symptom 
which tended to dominate consideration of the ailment as a whole.
  
29
                                                 
26 See e.g. M. Kumm , “The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in 
Europe Before and After the Constitutional Treaty (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262; also n1 
above 
 
27  See e.g.  M. Maduro, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action”  in N. 
Walker (ed) Sovereignty in Transition  (Oxford: Hart, 2003) 501-38 
28 Arguably, Maduro (n27 above) combines the two approaches.  For his more recent views, now 
extended to the wider global context, see his “Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial 
Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism” in Dunoff and Trachtman (eds)  
Ruling the World?356-80. 
29 This tendency has probably been accentuated by the fact that one of the more influential pluralist 
thinkers, Miguel Maduro, has served as an Advocate General at the European Court of Justice, and has 
delivered opinions which seem to reflect some of his academic thinking. See in particular, his opinion 
in Kadi v Council of the European Union; Case C 402/05, delivered on January 18th 2008; available at 
http://blogeuropa.eu/wp-content/2008/02/cnc_c_402_05_kadi_def.pdf.    
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3. Constitutional Pluralism Beyond Europe 
If we look at the prospect for the constitutionalisation of transnational sites and 
relations beyond the EU, the challenges set out above are posed much more sharply 
and insistently.  Faced with the proliferation of global institutions around the 
permanent  framework of the United Nations, of global and regional human rights 
charters and standard–setting bodies, of  new forms of regional economic organisation 
beyond Europe, of functionally specialist regimes of global public authority in matters 
such as crime, labour relations and environmental protection, and of private and 
hybrid public-private forms of  self-regulation and administrative capacity in other 
areas of specialist practical and epistemic authority from global cyberspace to 
international sport, constitutional pluralism finds itself in a less obviously receptive 
environment.30
 If we begin with the question of  the tendency of constitutionalism to embrace 
all normative phenomena within a singular logic and encompassing framework, this 
might seem the least likely ground of challenge to the  appropriateness of 
  So much so, indeed, that much of the broader literature on the global 
legal configuration implicitly or explicitly rejects the ideas of constitutional pluralism, 
while those approaches which seek to keep faith with constitutional pluralism and 
adapt it to the global scene struggle to justify their approach and occupy a less 
confident and secure position within the debate than they do in the European context. 
Let us again look at each of the three sceptical challenges in turn in order to illustrate 
these points. 
                                                                                                                                            
To be fair, however, Maduro himself has stressed more than most the need to look beyond the courts to 
broader institutional structures in order to understand pluralism in the round. See in particular, Maduro, 
n27 above. 
30 See, for example, N. Walker, “Beyond boundary disputes and basic grids; Mapping the global 
disorder of normative orders” (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 373-96; M. 
Rosenfeld, “Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism” (2008) 6 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 415-456; P. Zumbansen, “Defining the Space of 
Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance and Legal Pluralism” Osgoode Hall  Law 
School, Comparative Research in Law and Political Economy Research paper Series 21/2011. 
15 
 
constitutional pluralism within the wider transnational context. After all, are the most 
obvious features of the global legal landscape not precisely those that are 
“disorderly”?31 Rather than as a coherent whole, do we not think of the global legal 
configuration as fragmentary,32  as “polycontextual”,33  as embracing a “strange 
multiplicity”,34 as part of the diverse and sometimes impenetrable “mystery of global 
governance”?35
In some influential quarters of transnational constitutional thinking, however, 
just the opposite is the case. For some who want to take constitutionalism to the 
global level, it is precisely as a reaction against and in response to these underlying 
tendencies toward fragmentation.  Constitutionalism is embraced just because it is 
believed to have the capacity to re-impose order, to re-establish hierarchy, to 
articulate and apply a comprehensible redesign. This steering ambition comes in 
different variants. In one version, the singular model of transnational 
constitutionalism is institutionally located in the United Nations, its Charter 
functioning as an ersatz written Constitution for the post-war world order.
  And should we not, therefore, expect constitutionalism conceived of 
in a global key to match and reflect this underlying deep diversity, thereby adopting a 
sensibility that is pluralism-friendly? 
36 In other 
versions, the basis of constitutional order is lexical rather than institutional. In 
particular, there are a number of strains of the so-called constitutionalisation of 
international law, in which ‘international law’ is itself  protected and projected as a 
single juristic category.37
                                                 
31 Walker, n30 above.  
 Typically under this approach some types of international 
rules such as customary international law, ius cogens, human rights law, ‘world order’ 
32 Koskenniemi, n9 above. 
33 G. Teubner, “Constitutionalising Polycontextuality” (Unpublished paper). 
34 J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: CUP, 2005) 
35 Kennedy, n9 above. 
36 See e.g. Fassbender, n7 above. 
37 See e.g. De Wet, n8 above. 
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treaties and obligations erga omnes are deemed to have a special facility to organise 
the international order in a ‘constitution-like’ way. Whether due to their generative 
capacity, or their trumping quality, or their comprehensive reach, they stand apart 
from and above other international rules and lend some measure of coherence and 
integrity to the whole.  
 We should be careful not to overstate the unifying ambition of any of these 
brands of global constitutionalism. They are far from suggesting a world state to 
subsume and replace the category of nation states, and, indeed, rarely propose any 
kind of top-loaded federal design.38 As noted, their impulse tends to be reactive rather 
than proactive, a limited ‘re-ordering’ response to the deepening anarchy of global 
legal relations in world of ever more divergent and complexly overlapping 
jurisdictions rather than a new and  constitutive set of markings on a  legal  tabula 
rasa.  But these efforts do, nonetheless, continue to display distinct traces of a certain 
kind of singular and hierarchical strain of juristic thought that is closely associated 
with the tradition of state constitutionalism. The performative meaning of making a 
claim about the global regulatory sphere in ‘constitutional’ terms is one of 
authorization – indeed self-authorization. The language of constitutionalism is 
resorted to not just as a familiar trope of the legal imagination but as a way to outrank 
other rules and outflank other ways of conceiving of the global legal order.39
Yet a self-defeating irony surely lurks within such a bold discursive move.  On 
the one hand, it is precisely the lack of any agreed and settled  overall framework of 
legal authority for the proliferation of new sites of transnational legal authority in the 
  
                                                 
38  See e.g.  J. Habermas,  “Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still have a chance?” in 
J. Habermas, J. The Divided West (Cambridge: Polity, 2008) 115-210. Even though Habermas is 
unusual in explicitly proposing a multi-level institutional structure, of the three levels he proposes – 
global, regional and national – he allows the global by far the most limited jurisdiction, restricted to 
questions of peace and human rights.  
39  See e.g. Koskenniemi n9 above; Kennedy n9 above. 
17 
 
dense mosaic of global regulation that tempts a certain type of singular constitutional 
discourse to fill the vacuum. On the other hand, if constitutionalism’s ambition is to 
put its own claim to final authority beyond question, then the inherent disputability of 
any and all “global metaprinciples of legal authority”40
In summary, there is a monistic strain in transnational constitutionalism which, 
for all the comparative (to the state tradition) modesty of its remit, is fated to fall short 
in its bid to place its own authority beyond question, and justifiably so. Yet it is an 
active, and indeed growing, dimension of the discourse on transnational 
constitutionalism, one which implicitly or explicitly sets itself at odds with the various 
strains of constitutional pluralism, and one, therefore, which contributes to the overall 
hostility of the regulatory environment to the very idea of constitutional pluralism.  
 which underscores the 
unsettled quality of the transnational legal sphere means that constitutionalism in this 
singular mode cannot achieve its own ambition. What is more, just because of the 
underlying lack of settlement or of agreed general grounds for the justification of 
postnational constellation, any such singular constitutional discourse deserves to fail 
in its presumption of unassailable authority. 
This monistic strain, it follows, should be carefully distinguished precisely 
from those other explicitly constitutional conceptions of the global transnational order 
that seek to emphasize the diversity of transnational sites of authority. In these cases, 
the second and opposite challenge – namely the reconciliation of plurality in terms 
which remain at all constitutionally meaningful - comes into play, although, as we 
shall see, the first challenge continues to lurk in the near background. 
Those who stress the variety of the constitutional register at the global level, in 
turn, can be further divided fall into different sub-categories. On the one side, there 
                                                 
40  Walker n30 above, 386. 
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are those for whom pluralism, including a pluralism of constitutional sites and 
relations, is an unavoidable and irreversible consequence of the functional 
differentiation of world society. In a perspective closely associated with contemporary 
systems theory, the ever increasing autonomy of the globally ramified spheres of 
economy, ecology, science, education, health, sport, media, virtual communications 
etc, is postulated as both consequence and reinforcing cause of the decline of the role 
of the traditional politico-legal constitutionalism of the state as the effective container 
of the various specialist sub-systems within a particular territorial demarcation. 41 Yet 
the demise of a comprehensive mode of politico-legal constitutionalism – of a 
constitutionalism built around an idea of a self-contained community in which all 
matters of ‘public’ interest are contested and resolved in common, need not mean the 
end of constitutionalism tout court. Instead, in the systemic pluralist vision we are 
witnessing the development of new transnational forms of “societal 
constitutionalism.”42 According to this new global dynamic the “self-
constitutionalization”43 of the various specialist functional sectors is no longer 
grounded in and reducible to  the articulations either of  state law or the orthodox 
treaty regimes of international law, or indeed of any other canonical legal form.44
                                                 
41 See in particular the work of Gunther Teubner; e.g. n33 above; See also his  “Societal 
Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?” in C. Joerges, I-J Sand and G. 
Teubner (eds) Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Oxford: Hart, 2004) 3-28;   
 The  
new societal constitutions will continue to draw on these familiar juridical sources in 
their continuous processes of reflexive self-organisation, but the basic impulse 
towards self-constitutionalization and its governing logic is provided by the very 
character and domain concerns of the functional specialism itself; by the  methods 
available within its special medium of practice – and to those actors implicated in that 
42 Teubner, n41 above 
43Teubner, n33 above 
44 Such as the common-law based lex mercatoria. See Teubner, n33 above 
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medium of practice -   of communicating and realizing the forms of social power or 
influence  distinctive to that medium of practice.   
A more modest and familiar version of this kind of functionally-driven global 
constitutional pluralism can be found in the idea of ‘sectoral constitutionalization’.45 
Here the focus is upon the institutional centres and their conventional legal 
foundations rather than the functionally coded sites of practices as a whole. The 
accent is on the hybrid ‘”treaty-constitutions” 46 of special international organisations 
or regimes, such as the International Labour Organisation or the World Trade 
Organisation.  These are constitutive instruments for the legal domains in question, 
not just in terms of providing an institutional and norm-generating frame and claiming 
an original juridical authority, but also, and increasingly, in endorsing or encouraging 
a broader form of  erga omnes constitutional sensibility in terms of rights protection 
for the individuals affected by the regimes.47
To these positions the second challenge is a clear and pressing one. What 
makes the basic plurality of constitutional orders they describe pluralistic in nature? 
In what does the constitutional coherence between the parts consist? If as, Gunther 
Teubner, the leading exponent of modern systems theory, declares, “in the sea of 
globality there are only islands of constitutionality”,
  
48
                                                 
45  See e.g., A. Peters “Membership in the Global Constitutional Community” in J. Klabbers, A. Peters 
and G. Ulfstein (eds) The Constitutionalization of  International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 153-263, 
201-3 
 where are the constitutional 
causeways that connect these islands? The answer is not clear. If the emphasis is on 
the specificity of the newly emergent societal or sectoral constitutions in the absence 
of any corresponding newly emergent legal-political totality, then what, if anything, 
46 Ibid.  203. 
47 Ibid. 212-215. 
48  Teubner, n33 above. 
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links these constitutionally justified specificities in constitutional terms is 
problematic.  
One part of the answer may depend on structural analogy. Arguably, a key 
‘constitutive’  puzzle faced by the stakeholders of relatively autonomous global 
subsectors and by those who occupy their various external environments, namely how 
to balance the freedom of those most centrally concerned with and affected by a 
practice to govern that practice against the need to limit its expansion into other 
spheres and so to curb its tendency to  encroach on the autonomy of others sectors of 
social practice and their key stakeholders, is the functional equivalent under a globally 
differentiated order of  the traditional state constitutionalist concern to safeguard the 
‘internal sovereignty’ of ‘the people’ while ensuring that their ‘external sovereignty’ 
did not compromise the internal sovereignty of others.49 A second part of the answer 
may, more straightforwardly, concern common transversal norms. In particular, 
proponents of a differentiated form of global constitutionalism may argue that basic 
human rights standards should prevail across different societal or institutional sectors 
regardless of these cleavages. Indeed, on this view, the very proliferation of such 
cleavages and the problems of achieving ‘thicker’ forms of democratic 
constitutionalism in consequence serve to underline the importance of the alternative 
protection provided by globally guaranteed human rights standards.50
                                                 
49 Ibid. See also Krisch, ‘The Case for Pluralism” n11 above. 
 A third and 
final part of the answer might concern the relational dynamics themselves. If the 
global constitution is one of multiple and variable sectors, one in which the marginal 
connections and relations between sites of governance become central rather than 
peripheral, then perhaps there is some kind of underlying relational logic or, less 
passively, perhaps there can be developed terms and patterns of constitutional 
50 See e.g. Teubner, n33 above;  Peters n45 above. 
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exchange between these various sectors which can be accounted for or justified in 
terms of some kind of defensible constitutional reason. At a minimum, does the 
fragmentation of the transnational constitutional order into a heterarchy of sites not 
permit and even encourage the development of some kind of framework of mutual 
recognition and contestation, and of checks and balances between sites and their 
different claims to authority? And does the complex cross-polity institutionalization 
of a system of countervailing power not provide the basis from which pluralism can 
be transformed into a recognizable set of constitutional virtues?51
Certainly, there is in the approach of the ‘systemic’ constitutional pluralist 
some recognition and endorsement of all such solutions. The claim to move beyond a 
plurality to a pluralism of systems remains a precarious one, however. It stands in 
sustained tension with the sheer number, diversity, unpredictable emergence and 
uncontainable evolution of the islands of self-norming and institutional capacity in the 
new global constitutional archipelago. And it is in response to this and in an attempt 
to fashion a more systematic and encompassing set of constitutional steering 
mechanisms that we find another more universalist strain within global constitutional 
pluralism. This thread of constitutional pluralist thought - closely associated with 
Mattias Kumm
 
52 and others53
For Kumm, the modernist past remains the key to the future. The 
philosophical core of constitutionalism has not changed since the advent of modern 
constitutionalism through the medium of the maturing state system of late 18th 
 - adopts a different and more resolute approach to the 
tension between the two constitutional imperatives of the postnational constellation – 
the autonomy of the particular parts and the coherence of the whole.  
                                                 
51 See Krisch, n11 above  “The Case for Pluralism”; see also Rosenfeld, n29 above 
52 Kumm,  n1 above 
53 See in particular D. Halberstam, “Constitutional Heterarchy: the Centrality of Conflict in the 
European Union and the United States” in Dunoff and Trachtman (eds) Ruling the World? 326-55. 
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century Europe and America. Crucially, what is constitutionally basic for him is not a 
matter of institutional design but of underlying normative principles. These normative 
principles flow from the basic modernist ambition of persons self-conceived as free 
and equal individuals to act collectively to deliberate, develop and implement their 
own conception of the common interest or public good. Such meta-political 
foundations distinguish the modern age from the traditional hierarchies and the sense 
of human society as in thrall to a prior order of things which characterize earlier forms 
of social organisation and their associated social imaginaries.54 And from these 
foundations, according to Kumm, we can derive a set of universal constitutional 
commitments to principles of legality, subsidiarity, adequate participation and 
accountability, public reason and rights-protection.55
                                                 
54 See e.g.  C. Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).  
 Against this larger canvas the 
traditional state-centred constitutional system assumes a more modest significance 
than is often appreciated within constitutional thought. It is exposed as but one 
architectural representation of the underlying principles, rather than an exclusive or 
dominant or even optimal template for constitutional government. Instead, under 
conditions of intensifying globalization the basically cosmopolitan texture of a 
constitutionalism committed to universal principles becomes more apparent, and the 
state is now but one constitutional player on a wider stage. As free and equal persons 
operating under certain constraints of interest, information, geography and affinity, 
we continue to respect particular contexts of decision-making and public interest 
formation, and the principles of subsidiarity, participation and accountability 
recognize this. However, as free and equal persons we are also categorically 
committed to acknowledgment of the freedom and equality of all others, and so to the 
universalisability of our political condition. In this way, we can reconcile our 
55 Kumm, n1 above.  
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commitment to particular polities and sites of authority with a belief in an overarching 
normative framework which informs the terms of our various particular 
manifestations of public authority. In the final analysis, the global division of the 
world into particular polities remains inevitable but the particular form that such a 
division takes is not so; rather, it is contingent upon shifts in the underlying circuits of 
social and economic power.  
By replacing institutional or lexical hierarchy with normative universalism, 
Kumm, and those with similar visions, find a more robust answer to the second 
challenge than is available to the systemic pluralists while avoiding the more obvious 
dangers of constitutional monism. Inevitably, however, the idea of constitutionalism 
as a single cloth, however divorced from traditional conceptions of hierarchy, brings 
the first challenge very much back into the frame. Is such a confident claim on behalf 
of constitutionalism – even if its focus is on general principles rather than a particular 
vertical design of rules or institutions, not just one more hegemonic move on behalf of 
a singular constitutional vision? And how genuinely pluralist can such a vision be if 
its basic normative contours are settled in advance, even if only at the high level of 
abstraction proposed by Kumm? 
One author who has posed these questions more keenly and insistently than 
most is Nico Krisch.56 For him, it seems that constitutionalism in a global age   is 
caught in a Procrustean dilemma. On the one hand, the kind of “foundational 
constitutionalism”57
                                                 
56 See references at n11 above.  
 well-known from the state tradition – the ‘thick’ variant based 
upon the constituent power of the collective people living in a distinct all-embracing 
political society – simply does not suit the more fragmented circumstances of  the 
global age. On the other hand, if we try to stretch and adapt constitutionalism to fit 
57 Krisch, n11 above, “Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition” 
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these new conditions we are faced with a series of unsatisfactory alternatives. Either, 
in a first case, we retain something of the monistic legacy of constitutionalism – a 
holistic architectural or (at least) intellectual vision which, in its excessive ambition 
and self-assertion, lacks both legitimacy and plausibility in an age of global diversity. 
Or, in a second case,   we are guilty of a kind of constitutional dilution or corruption, 
retaining  the term ‘constitutional’ as an overstated or inappropriate label for an  
entirely new type of institutional and normative complex. In particular, if, as is the 
case with the  systemic forms of pluralism,  all we  retain from the tradition of state 
constitutionalism is a commitment to various of its ‘thin’ properties, - juridical 
autonomy, an institutional formwork of checks and balances, and fundamental rights 
protection - but without  any plausible sense of an authoritative frame for locating 
these within a single constitutional universe, then perhaps the constitutional label 
becomes a mere placebo or distorting diversion. That is to say, constitutionalism may 
become a source of complacency – a false promise and false comfort in a world that 
no longer bends to its design, or a source of confusion – a category mistake in a  
world that needs new categories. In either event constitutionalism threatens to become 
an impediment rather than a guide in the search for optimal solutions to the question 
of governing new configurations of social power. 
This takes us directly to the third challenge and the alternative solutions 
suggested by that third challenge. For pluralism to make sense as a normative register 
for the contemporary global order – and bearing in mind the extent to which empirical 
conditions of global regulation militate against anything other than a pluralist 
understanding - then perhaps the ‘constitutional’ descriptor just has to be dropped. As 
Krisch himself suggests, in the last analysis constitutionalism and the scale and 
quality of the pluralist understanding adequate to the global age may simply be 
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irreconcilable.58 Perhaps, the best way of ensuring the pluralist virtues of mutual 
contestation, recognition and adaptation  and a complex framework of checks and 
balances, conceived of as a modest framework of co-ordination between relatively 
autonomous polities,59
 
 is to detach them from a constitutional discourse which is 
unsympathetic on either side of this delicate ambition; either in the strength of its 
traditional championing of the autonomy of the parts or in its effort to conceive of the 
new in terms of an idea of totality and integrity which also borrows from the old.   
4. Pluralism and the  Constitutional Legacy 
So, what, if anything, does constitutional pluralism under conditions of globalization 
have left to offer in the light of these challenges?  This question is most profitably 
addressed by adjusting our lens slightly and by approaching the constitutional 
predicament from a somewhat different angle than above, and by taking note of a 
clear bifurcation that has emerged in the use and treatment of constitutional ideas in 
the global age. 
 On the one hand, as a source of doctrine the accumulated arsenal of 
constitutional thought is treated in an ever more eclectic manner in the global age. 
Constitutional doctrine is drawn upon for both epistemic and symbolic reasons – as a 
rich resource of resilient ideas of good governance couched in a language which also 
happens to carry a distinguished and potentially authority-inspiring legacy.  The 
spread and adaptation well beyond the traditional container of the nation state of tried 
and tested aspects of constitutional doctrine such as fundamental rights protection, 
separation of powers and institutional balance, federalism and subsidiarity, due 
process and natural justice, proportionality and balancing, or ‘hard look’ doctrines and 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 Krisch, n11 above, “The Case for Pluralism” 
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requirements to give good reasons, speaks to a process of widespread “low 
intensity”60
On the other hand, we also find constitutionalism used as reference point for 
the most encompassing (re)imagination of the global body politic. Whether in the 
work of Habermas, or Teubner, or Kumm, or – even if he ultimately rejects the 
constitutional label – of Krisch, constitutionalism provides a point of departure for the 
broadest consideration of the nature and resilience of the modernist settlement in legal 
and political thought.  Again, as with constitutionalism as doctrine, constitutionalism 
as imagination sends a reasonably coherent message – certainly at the highest levels 
of abstraction reached by this broader mode of thought. Recall that, for Kumm,  
constitutionalism is about the political promise of an unprecedented epoch in which 
free and equal individuals make over society in their own terms;
 dissemination. Constitutionalism becomes a mobile resource, a ‘thin’ and 
footloose structure and stylization of norms used to qualify and dignify the emergent 
sites of a new global regulatory structure of authority without being constitutive of 
these sites in the ‘thick’ manner redolent of the nations state. Constitutionalism on this 
view is a matter of detail, adding an older texture to new governance forms rather than 
providing a formative inspiration.  
61 or, as Habermas or 
Krisch would have it, constitutionalism is about the development of the very idea of 
public autonomy – about how individuals constitute themselves in public as a public 
and with due regard to and in symbiotic relationship with  their equal freedom in the 
sphere of private autonomy;62
                                                 
60  M. Maduro, “The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the 
Authority of Constitutionalism” (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 332, 340. 
 or as Teubner would argue, constitutionalism is about 
61 Kumm,  n1 above. See also the exchange between  Kumm and Krisch on EJIL: Talk! in 2009, 
following the publication of Dunoff and Trachtman (eds) Ruling the World? ; available at 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/author/mkumm/ 
62 See e.g. J. Habermas “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles” 
(2001) 28, Political Theory  766-781. Krisch  n11 above, “The Case for Pluralism”, and his EJIL: Talk! 
exchange with Krisch,  n60 above. 
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the balance between the autonomy and self-limitation of different functional sectors 
inter se  in a differentiated order – with autonomy retained as a deep freedom and 
equality-respecting  ideal even as its emergent forms  escape our received modern 
distinction between a generically public and a generically private sphere.63
 Where constitutionalism as doctrine is about detail, constitutionalism as 
imagination, by contrast, sets the broadest of horizons. Crucially, however, for all 
their contrasting features, the two levels of constitutional discourse for a global age 
share a common absence. Where constitutionalism as doctrine is too specific in its 
various remits and too past-derivative to provide a key formative influence for the 
new post-Westphalian sites of authority, constitutionalism as imagination for its part 
is both too general in scope and substantive ambition and too dependent upon the 
dominant procedural heritage of state constitution-making to provide a formative 
influence for these new constitutional sites. 
 In all 
cases, constitutionalism serves as a reminder of modernity’s resilient ambition for the 
collective self-constitution of the social and political world in a moral universe in 
which the individual is the basic unit 
In other words, we are faced in post-Westphalian world with a situation in 
which constitutionalism arguably flies too low or too high, either too dependent on 
other forms or too independent of any particular forms. Why this is so is both 
consequence and reinforcing cause of the changing structure of constitutional 
authority in a post-state world. In the state tradition, the imaginative and the doctrinal 
dimensions of constitutionalism tended to be closely aligned through the dimension of 
constituent power. For constitutionalism in this mode was concerned as much with 
formative influence – with the particular pouvoir constituant  and the ideas of guiding 
                                                 
63 Teubner, n32 above.   
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purpose and ultimate justification associated  with the making of political community 
-  as  with the tool-kit of mechanisms through which the duly formed and constituted 
authority - the  pouvoir constitué – seeks through doctrine to express and represent its 
constitutive source. State constitutionalism, in other words, was concerned both with 
the framing of the particular sites of authority and with the detail of what was framed. 
Constitutionalism in the state tradition, therefore,  was always about treating the 
‘spirit’ and the ‘letter’ of the law within a single frame of reference, about background 
culture as well as foreground text, about the regulative ideal as well as the regulated 
practice, about deep ‘second order’ justification as well as immediate ‘first order’ 
validity and technique. In short, it was about both imagination and doctrine, and about 
how the imaginative and the doctrinal were closely joined and mutually nourished 
through the container of the self-constituting and self-constituted polity. Certainly, 
there was also a dimension to the constitutional imagination which was prepared to 
reach beyond the state, which treated the constitutions of different and other free and 
equal peoples as morally comparable and ethically associated units. But this global 
dimension remained parasitic upon the more basic connection between the 
imaginative and the doctrinal dimensions in the context of the state.64
Crucially, the post-Westphalian world of constitutionalism severs this basic 
connection between the doctrinal and the imaginative while often remaining in 
retrospective thrall to the significance of such a connection in the high modern era of 
state-centred constitutionalism. An appreciation of this point allows us to 
reconceptualise and restate the various dilemmas of constitutional pluralism in global 
context as flowing from the expectation to do too much with too few resources. The 
low-flying constitutionalism-as-doctrine seems to claim too much, at least by 
 
                                                 
64 See N. Walker. “Out of Time and Out of Place: Law’s Fading Co-ordinates” (2010) 14 Edinburgh 
Law Review, 13-46. 
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implication, in using the historically formative register of constitutionalism to account 
for a regulatory context in which such constitutionalism as is available is no longer 
doing and can no longer do that formative work, but is instead merely supplying the 
regulatory technology for an already and otherwise formed site of authority. Hence 
the criticism that constitutionalism is tendentially but inappropriately inclined to 
monism, and  the related claim that the language of global regulatory pluralism finds a 
more becoming modesty if the descriptor ‘constitutional’ is removed from the units 
we seek to conceive of within the pluralist structure. Equally, however, the high-
flying constitutionalism-as-imagination presumes too much if it treats itself as an 
encompassing  meta-authoritative normative frame for the plurality of sites of global 
constitutional authority. Rather, its claim and message is prior to the particular forms 
of constitutionalism and the particular norms associated with these forms. What it can 
offer is precisely not a higher-order or framing legal normativity – a kind of  
constitutional super-doctrine -  for that would presuppose  a formative and framing 
role which it does not possess and which it could not posses without claiming new 
constitutional unity; instead, all it can offer is a deeper and normatively unrealized 
form of constitutional pre-orientation. 
If we return briefly to the special case of the European Union and its 
inappropriateness as a paradigm for postnational constitutionalism more generally, we 
may observe how the severing of the two registers of constitutionalism is here less 
evident, and less evidently problematic. Constitutionalism-as-doctrine in the European 
Union bears such a close resemblance to many state forms and remains so closely 
connected to its statist roots that, as we have seen,    its ‘thin’ credentials are widely 
respected, and also treated by many as a sound basis on which a pluralist connection 
between the national and the supranational spheres of influence might be forged. And 
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while there has been much controversy over just how much legitimacy this ‘thin’ 
constitutionalism supplies,  and also about whether it can or should be supplemented 
by a ‘thick’ foundational constitutionalism, at least the EU has developed in a 
sufficiently state-like direction  that the linking of the supranational constitutional 
imagination to a recognizable politically constituent process has remained a viable 
ambition for many – or at least did so until the demise of the Constitutional Treaty in 
2007. In short, neither constitutionalism-as-doctrine nor constitutionalism-as-
imagination seem to be as disconnected from their traditional basis of support as they 
do in the wider global sphere. Constitutional pluralism appears more plausible, as, 
too, in some measure does the alternative of a new constitutional unity. 
In the global context, in the absence of the lock of constituent power the two 
levels of constitutional discourse are more clearly stratified and more palpably 
incomplete in the absence of the other. Yet just as postnational constitutionalism in 
general is not best understood in the paradigm of the European Union, postnational 
constitutionalism beyond the European Union should not be discounted just because 
in some respects its development compares unfavourably with that of the European 
Union. For it does not follow from the misalignment of the two constitutional 
discourses – constitutionalism-as-doctrine and constitutionalism-as-imagination - that 
there is no value in seeking to preserve and develop the modern constitutional legacy 
at either or both levels under conditions of contemporary global pluralism.  Rather, it 
seems that the continuing value of constitutionalism, and the basis for believing that 
any such value outweighs its disadvantages,   lies precisely in the combination of 
those answers it does still provide and those questions it raises in lieu of the answers it 
can no longer provide. 
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If we first consider constitutionalism-as-doctrine, as already noted we cannot 
deny the value of the constitutional normative resource-set accumulated over the 
period of political modernity, or its continuing applicability to non-state sites, 
however partial, fragmented and “non-holistic”65 many of these site are. The various 
functionally specific and/or institutionally clustered points of non-state authority may 
have come to resemble nodes in a global network, each made up of a complex mix of 
internal self-regulation  and diverse external regulation, rather than each providing a 
self-contained regulatory universe of its own, as in the state tradition.66
This point is placed in sharp and reinforcing perspective when we turn to 
reconsider constitutionalism-as-imagination. In one respect, this serves as an 
orientating reminder of what should underscore and inform our puzzles of governance 
in state or state-like holistic settings and non-holistic settings alike. The 
constitutionalist vision recalls the abiding importance of the meta-political question of 
how to generate, adjudicate and apply our common interest in accordance with our 
common standing as free and equal persons, even in a post-state world in which the 
subject, mechanisms and object of common interest are out of kilter, and where, 
accordingly, ‘we’ increasingly do not get to address the common interest question in 
its entirety in common. However, this paradoxical feature of the common interest 
should not defeat but should guide our efforts to interpret the ‘letter’ of constitutional 
doctrine in light of the ‘spirit’ of constitutionalism. The contextual appropriateness 
and refinement of all of our particular inherited constitutional techniques, from rights 
protection through doctrines of consultation and due process to our manifold methods 
 Yet many of 
the same basic puzzles of governance are being addressed, and so much of the same 
technology of governance remains appropriate.  
                                                 
65 See N. Walker, “Beyond the Holistic Constitution?”  in Dobner and Loughlin (eds) 291-308. 
66 I bid. 297-303. 
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for the devolution of legal power, should be informed by our adjusted sense of the 
elusive but still vital centrality of the idea of common interests amongst equals in a 
multi-centred world of overlapping and partial authorities.  
Yet constitutionalism-as-imagination, as well as showing us how to keep the 
cup of self-government half-full, is also  salutary in underlining our sense  that it is 
half-empty. As well as serving as an important reminder of the deeper purpose of 
particular constitutional doctrines and the flexibility of their application, it also 
highlights what we no longer have or can guarantee to preserve. Constitutionalism-as-
imagination recalls to us that in a context of constitutional foundationalism our sense 
of the political realm, of constituent power and of constituted power were linked 
together in a continuous framing logic, but that the sorts of constitutional questions 
we once posed and addressed within a joined-up political container  now increasingly 
arise in a manner so fragmented and loosely coupled that they threaten the very 
promise of ‘the  political’ as embodying our  capacity to make over the world in our 
own terms. Constitutionalism-as-imagination thus also functions as a kind of 
“placeholder”67
 
 for what is in danger of being lost if we abandon our commitment to 
think and act as authors of the constitutive conditions of political society - however  
diverse and complexly intermingled the transnational societal reference of that 
political society might be - and acts as a continual  prompt for us to seek to retain that 
aspiration, however formidable,  and fashion its pursuit  to our new circumstances. 
5. Constitutional Pluralism?  
 
                                                 
67 Koskenniemi, n9 above, 30. 
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But even if in these ways constitutionalism in general does remain relevant to 
the global conditions of late modernity, one last important question of language 
remains. Does the kind of loosely aligned dual-pronged approach to the sustenance of 
a constitutional discourse suggested here fit well with the particular perspective of 
constitutional pluralism which provided the starting point for our analysis? 
The answer is a mixed one. In one sense constitutional pluralism is a product 
of the very structure of state-centred political modernity we are trying to look and 
think beyond. It is an attempt to solve a problem that is becoming outmoded. 
Constitutional pluralism, conceived of as idea of a constitutionally relevant 
connection between self-authorizing constitutional sites, silently assumes something 
like the statist template of constituent power as the legitimate basis for the self-
authorization of the post-national constitutional sites. If self-authorization 
increasingly lacks that legitimation, however, the focus of our concern shifts to the 
broader question of what form of legitimation is possible in place of or in 
supplementation of site-specific self-authorization.68
On the other hand, if we think of constitutional pluralism not as a series of 
doctrinal or otherwise constitutionally relevant answers to the puzzle of how different 
constitutions connect, but simply as referring to the continuing relevance of 
 At the same time,  with the 
weakening of the sources of internal, site-specific legitimation, our sense of the 
constitutional ‘closure’ of the various sites is reduced, and so, in consequence, is the 
puzzle of how such increasingly ‘open’ sites  can relate to each other constitutionally. 
In other words, the less site-specific we understand constitutional authority to be, the 
less problematic we conceive constitutional movement across boundaries, and the less 
sharply framed the original definitive questions of constitutional pluralism appear. 
                                                 
68  See e.g.  S. Besson, “Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism, and Democracy” 
in Dunoff and Trachtman (eds) Ruling the World? 381-408. 
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constitutionalism in locating and addressing the mix of empirical and normative 
factors which contribute to the deep pluralism of the emerging global order, then it 
certainly remains a relevant conceptual point of departure. Our understanding of 
constitutionalism   may have been unbundled to a degree that make the original 
Europe-centred debate about the constitutional “plurality of unities”69
                                                 
69  H. Lindahl, “Sovereignty and Representation in the European Union” in N.Walker (ed) Sovereignty 
in Transition 87-114. 
 less 
paradigmatic. Yet that very process of unbundling, and the new horizons of meta-
political debate it opens up, are strikingly indicative of the ways in which the 
constitutional legacy remains relevant both as a path-dependent influence upon and as 
a means of collective sensitization towards our complexly differentiated and 
interconnected global order.     
